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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEO M. BERTAGNOLE, INC.,
a corporation,
BERTAGNOLE INVESTMENT
COMPANY· LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (Substituted)
PlaintiffRespondent

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

)

vs.
PINE MEADOW RANCHES,
a corporation, et al,
DefendantsRespondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16900

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to quiet title to the portions of
two roads crossing a section of real estate in which the legal
title is owned by Plaintiffs-Appellants.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial, a Judgment and Decree was entered against
Plaintiff-Appellant in favor of Defendant-Respondents, declaring
that Plaintiff-Appellant's title to the real estate in question
is subject to a public road thirty (30) feet in width.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
That the lower court's judgment be reversed and title
to the real estate in question be quieted in appellants subject
to easements of record.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
For the purpose of this brief, appellant shall be
referred to hereafter as plaintiff and respondents shall collectively be referred to hereafter as defendants.
The property involved in this action is Section 35,
Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and is located at the mouth of a canyon known as Tollgate Canyon.
Section 35 is divided into two parts by Interstate 80, a nonaccess highway (previously Highway 30), Silver Creek, and some
railroad tracks.

When the freeway was constructed, duri_ng 1962 -

1965, an overpass was built and designated "Ranch Exit".

There

are two roads crossing the West portion of Section 35 which are ,
the principal subject of the action.

Exhibits P-16 through 19

are aerial photographs depicting Section 35 and the roads.

At

page 179 of the record is a copy of one of the aerial photograph
showing the roads in yellow.

The following page is a reproduc-

tion of that page colored as in the Exhibit.

The black line nea,

the "Y" in th.e road is the boundary of plaintiff's property.
This· action was commenced August 12, 1974 (R. 07), a
short time after plaintiffs became aware of the development of
a subdivis·ion and use of the s·ubject road as an access to said

subdivision.
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The evidence is that there was a road in Tollgate
Canyon dating back as early as 1915 used for hauling supplies
to sheepherders in the area to the North and West of the
Bertagnole land in Section 35. The road, to the middle 1960s.
was generally described by the witnesses as a "2 rut" road.
It was also used by deer hunters and for picnics.

The sheep

men who used the road were Fay Bates, John Bates, the Richins
and Bittners who owned grazing land adjoining and in close
proximity to the Bertagnole land.
Fay Bates testified that he owned Section 26 which
was likewise divided by Silver Creek, the railroad track, and
the highway.

He grazed sheep on the part of Section 35 located

West of Silver Creek and the Bertagnoles grazed the Bates land
in Section 26 East of Silver Creek.

Bates never asked per-

miss lon to use the road across Section 35.
deposition (R. 216, pp. 27-29).

See Fay Bates'

It is apparent that this ex-

change of use of portions of the sections mentioned was for
practical reas·ons .
The Bates sold thei.r grazing land to Darrell Christenson in 1965

1

who bought th.e property for resale.

about 480 acres in 1966, and leased
men for grazing

purposes~

b.~e

He sold

remaining land to sheep

There is no evidence of any change

of use 0r substantial improvement of the roads crossing Section

35 between 1966 and 1970.

The evidence is that Christenson, or

his corporatton, sold acreage in the sections North of Tollgate
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Canyon for subdivision and resale to
corporations in 1970.

Br~nt

Jensen 'and his

A program of road widening and con-

struction took place from 1970 through 1977.

In 1977, Amoco

constructed and improved roads to its oil or gas well.
A table showing issuance of building permits was
offered in evidence, Exhibit D-3 (R. 158).

It shows the per-

mits issued through 1974 as follows:

1972

8

1973

11

1974

10

Brent Jensen testified that 595 lots have been sold and 49 to

50 miles of road constructed since 1972 (T-135 and T-148) .
Lot owners have constructed 120 cabins.

Exhibits D-6 and D-7

show the roads constructed in the subdivided area.
Brent Jensen testified that he improved the road by
grading it (T. 106); that the wearing surface of the road was

12' to 13' wide in 1970 (T. 113); that he had never been told
by the Bertagnoles that the rpad crossing the Bertagnole property was not a public road; th.at h_e had never been denied
access; and that he was unaware of any objection to the use of
the road and land in Section 35 until this suit was filed.

(T. 120-121)

On cross-examination, he admitted receipt of the

several letters, showing that over a period of nearly a year
be_fe)re this suit was filed th_ere had been correspondence and
negotiations between the Bertagnoles' attorney and agents and
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Brent Jensen and his corporations and agents relating to the
unauthorized use of the road and of the Bert1gnole land ~l·St
of the freeway as a site for a sales office.

Several deadlines

for the filing of the suit were mentioned in the letters and
the filing of the suit was delayed pending negotiations for the
purchase by Jensen of Section 35 or that part of the Section
located West of the freeway.

(T. 165-176)

The negotiations relating to the use and proposed
sale of land in Section 35 were described generally by Greg
Lawson who participated in them.

With Brent Jensen's admissions

on cross-examination and the testimony of Leo Bertagnole, Harold
Bertagnole, and Greg Lawson (R. 168), there can be no doubt about
the Bertagnoles' objections to the use of the road well before
the suit was filed.

ARGUMENT
I

THE ROADWAYS IN QUESTION HAVE NOT BEEN DEDICATED AND
ABANDONED TO THE USE OF THE PUBLIC BY CONTINUOUS
USE FOR A PERIOD OF TEN YEARS PRIOR
TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE LAW SUIT
A.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF ESTABLISHING PUBLIC USE

FOR THE REQUIRED PERIOD OF TIME IS ON THOSE CLAIMING IT.
The law is well settled in this State that the burden
of proof that a road has been dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public is on those claiming it.
We quote from Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417
P 2d 646 at p. 648:
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"In connection with this review we deem it
appropriate to note our agreement that.the dedication of one's property to a public use should
not be regarded lightly and that certain principles.· should be adhered to. The presumption
is in favor of the troperty owner; and the burd~n
of establishing pub ic use for the required period
of time is on those claiming it. The mere fact
that members of the public may use a private
driveway or alley without interference will not
necessarily establish it as a public way ... "
(Emphasis added)
In· Peterson v·. · Combe, 20 Utah 2d 3 76, 438 P 2d 545
(1968) at Page 546, the following is held:
" .... we think the burden of proving a real
public use continuously for 10 years was not met
here in the light of principles to the effect that
dedication of right to the public generally must
·be displayed by clear and convincing evidence.
Th~s we say even in view of the other principle
that on review we canvass the facts in a light
more favorable to the conclusions of the arbiter
of the facts. These principles clash somewhat,
but where individual property rights are at stake
we must not treat such rights lightly."
See also Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P 291;
and Thomps·on, Real Property, Vol. 2, Sec. 525.
The defendants are seeking a judgment declaring that
the part of the Tollgate road in Section 35 has been dedicated
and abandoned to the use of the public on the theory that the
road has been used by the public continuously for a period of
ten years as provided by Section 27-12-89 UCA, 1953.

This

section provides:
"A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated
and abandoned to the use of the public when it
has been continuously us·ed as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years."
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The Su?reme Court of Utah has construed the above
quoted secti~n in several cases and has defined its

~

erm:.;.

The case of Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243. 161 P.
1127, holds that there must be evidence of intent by the
owner to dedtcate a road to the public and an acceptance by
the public to establish a public road.
The Court in the case of Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah
2d 340, 273 P 2d 720, at p. 723, quotes with approval a definition of the word "thoroughfare" and points out that the mere
fact that a private way is also used by the public, without
objection by the owner, will not make it a public way.
The recent case of Harding v. Bohman, 26 Utah 2d,
439, 491 P 2d 233, was an action by a landowner to have a certain strip of land declared a public highway.

The record

showed use by sheepmen and deer hunters and that the road was
not maintained at public expense.

The finding of the trial

court that the evidence failed to show a public dedication was
sustained and the judgment affirmed.
In Peterson v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P 2d 545,
the Court held that evidence that a road was used by property
owners abutting or straddling the road and that property at the
end of the road had no allure for the public was insufficient
to show public use.

In the case of ·Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391
p 2d 426, the Court affirmed a Summary Judgment where there was
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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no showing of ·intent of the landowners to establish a public

road.
The case of Thomp·son v. Gondas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 439
P 2d 639, holds that" .... clear and convincing quantum and
quality of proof .... " is neces-sary for the establishment of a
publi.c thoroughfare.
Text writers state the rule that the intent of the
landowner to dedicate the road to public use and acceptance by
the public must be sh.own by clear and convincing evidence.

In

Ti.ff any Real· Prope·rty '(Jr'd Ed) , Vol. 4, Section 1102, it is
stated that the mere t'act th.at the land has been used by the
public does not, of itself, sh.ow a dedication thereof by the
owner.

We quote:
"And the owner's mere acquiescense in the use
of land by th.e public for purposes of travel or
recreation can furnish but slight evidence of dedication when such land is unenclosed land, not in
use for the purpose of cultivation or otherwise.
Dedicat:Lon will not be. inferred from mere permissive
use of unenclosed land."
In Powell on ReaT Pr·operty, Vol. 6A, Section 934, it

i.s stated:
"The operative facts requisite for the finding of a dedication have two aspects, the objec.tively manifested desire of the landowner to
devote a land interes·t to public use, and the
public acceptance of the offer."
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B·

THE RECORD DOES :HJT SHOW THE REQUISITE

INTENTION OF THE LANDOWNERS TO DEDICATE OR ABANDQ:; THEIR

LAND TO THE USE OF THE PUBLIC AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE PUBLIC.
The defendants have not in their pleadings or at
the trial indicated over what ten year period the Bertagnoles
or their predecessors dedicated or abandoned their land to
public use.

During the period from the 1930s to 1971, the

land, which is now subdivided by Brent Jensen and his corporations, was used by the Bates and other sheep men for summer
grazing of sheep.

Darrell Christensen testified that he

purchased the land in 1965 and leased it for sheep grazing from
1966 to 1971.

Subdivision and lot sales took place from 1972

to date and unquestionably the road was improved and used by
numerous cabin owners during and after 1972.
In view of the fact that this action was filed in
1974, it is obvi:ous that the only ten year period which can
be relied upon to show dedication of the Bertagnole land to
public use would include at least eight years when the use of
the road was by sheep men, deer hunters, and people on picnics.

These uses were not for public benefit, but were for private
uses to property owners own land or were for persons who were
trespassi~g

on or using private land with or without permission.

The evidence did not show any public land accessible only by

the road in question.

Section 27-12-89 should not be construed

to grant access to the general public to areas under private
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ownership where no public need is shown.

In the present case

no evidence was presented showing a public allure as referred
to in Peterson v. Combe, supra.

There is also no showing of

any kind that the county or other public entity improved the
road or otherwise showed any intention to accept it as a public
road.
On the contrary the evidence is clear and beyond
dispute that the State of Utah acquired a strip of land lying
West of the West line of the freeway in Section 35 North of the
overpass for a stock trail and East of the East line of the
freeway South of the overpass for a stock trail.

It will be

noted that the Final Order of Condemnation, referred to above,
requires the State of Utah to " .... keep, maintain and repair in
reasonable and satisfactory condition the livestock fence located
on the condemned premises and adjoining the remaining land of the
defendant herein .... "

The testimony is that the fence was con-

structed and that a gate in the fence constructed by the State of
'

Utah and blocking the new Tollgate road had been removed and
destroyed (Exhibit 1).
The State of Utah acquired the easement for a livestock
trail by order of condemnation in 1967 which is quoted from above,
Any claim of a public road based on use since that date would be
subordinate to the State Easement.
I.n the earlier years, before the construction of the
freeway and the fence along the stock trail, there is evidence
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from disinterested witnesses Gillmor (R. 209-221), Willi~
Bittner (R. 221-235) and Frank Toole (R. 176-187) that there
was a fence across the mouth of Tollgate Canyon and a gate.
It will be noted that the deed quoted from above from Boley
to Uinta Pipeline Company requires the grantee to erect gates
and to provide good locks with keys.
Another significant fact which negates any claimed
intent on the part of the landowners to dedicate the road to
the public is that the two-rut road went nowhere except to
private livestock grazing land.

It is impossible to believe

that sheep men who are always on the alert to protect the herd
from public interference intended to establish a public road to
give the public access to the herd.

See the deposition of Fay

Bates (R. 216, pages 30 and 31), where he stated that he often
wished someone would control the road.

There is evidence that

the present owners have tried to exclude deer hunters.

This is

inconsistent with a public road.
The aerial photos. show a change of approach and road
location in Section 35 between 1962 and 1967.

There is no

evidence to indicate that the Bertagnoles intended public use
of the new approach from the overpass to a road on the North
of the creek.

This possibility must be entirely disregarded

because there was no ten-year period between the completion of
t:

the highway project and 1974 when this action was filed.

Further,

the correspondence and negotiations between Brent Jensen and the
-11-
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Bertagnoles proves that the Bertagnoles actually did not intend to abandon their property to public use.
There is a dispute in the evidence as to ·whether the
old road went up Tollgate Canyon from the old state highway on
the. South or North side of the creek.

It is undisputed that

the road constructed by the pipeline company and other utility
companies was on the South side in Section 35 and shows very
clearly on the aerial ph.otos.

Fay Bates testified that between

1949 and 1958 the utility companies made major repairs on the
road.

See Fay Bates' deposition (R. 216, pages 42 and 43).

It

is very clear from his testimony that the road up the canyon
was on the South. side.

Th.ere was a major change in the road

location after construction of the freeway.
The testimony that for practical reasons the Bertagnole
and Bates· exchanged the use o:E the part of Section 35 West of the
highway, track and Silver Creek for the part of Section 26 lying
East of the barriers mentioned shows that any use of Section 35
West of the highway was permissive and for the convenience of
the parties.

It could not,

th~refore,

be evidence of intent to

abandon to a public use.

II

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRJAL COURT'S
FINDING AND JUDGMENT THAT A PUBLIC ROAD
THIRTY FEET IN WIDTH WAS ABANDONED TO THE PUBLIC
For the purpose of argument only, if it is assumed
that tne road in question was in fact dedicated to the public
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in accordance with Section 27-12-89, UCA, 1953. then an
appropriate width must be determined for the road.
The above-referenced statute does not contain any
guide as to how the width is determined.

In the instant case

the trial court in its memorandum decision inserted the notation that the roadway is "15' wide" (R. 178).

In the Findings

of Fact at R. 203 and the Conclusions of Law at R. 204, SO feet
in width was typed and the trial court made a pen and ink change
with initials to 30'.

This doubled the width of the road from

that found in the original memorandum decision (R. 178).
In Boyer v. Clark, 7 U 2d 395, 326 P 2d 107 (1958),
where a public road was determined to have been dedicated in
accordance with Section 27-12-89 UCA 1953, the Supreme Court
remanded for the lower court to determine the width of the road
with the following instruction:
'' .... the width of the highway, which must be
determined in accordance with what is reasonable
and necessary for the uses to which the road has
been put.''
See also Blonguist v. Blonquist, 30 U 2d 234, 516 P 2d.
343 (J.973}.
The determination as to width must therefore be based
upon uses- to which ~he road was put during the applicable 10
year period provided for in Section 27-12-89 UCA 1953.

In the

present case, the testimony concerning the use of the road ·..1as
that it was limited to hauling sheep supplies, picnics, deer
hunting and fishing, and there was no evidence of other uses
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pr:L-or to the. development of subdivision in 1970 when Brent
Jensen acqui.red property- above.the road in question in
Section 35 (JL 105).

Mr. Jens-en testified that the road in

19.70. was passable by car (R. 105), and as· follows at Page 113
of the transcript:
"A. Oh, the wearing surface of the road I
would say would probably be maybe twelve feet wide,
thirteen· feet wide.

nq. The travelled portion of the road was
twelve or thi.rteen feet wide?
"A.

R~ght,

the

weari~g

surface.

"Q. Now, where would that width be, was it
that wide in 19-- or in Section 35?
r'A.

I would say probably.

''Q,.

D.id you ever measure it?

''A.

No, not really.

"Q. Was that road in Section 35 North of the
creek "grave.Ile.cl?
""A.

No._''

There was· no evidence of any

buildi~g

permits having

beeri. iss:ued i:n. th.e ·areas above the. road in question prior to
19.72...
th~t

In view of thi.s, and th.e. 0th.er testimony previously cited

there i's no evidence of us·e of the road as primary access

tq a subdivi.s·ion during any ten year period required by Section

27-12-89., UCA, 1953, prior to th.e commencement of this lawsuit

i-:n August 1974.
The question to be resolved is what width of road is

reasonable and necessary for use by sheepmen, picnickers., hunters!
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and fishermen.

The road across plainliffs' property is

approximately 1100 feet.

(R. 21)

established prior to the

filing of the lawsuit, a single

In each of the uses

lane road wide enough for one vehicle is all that is reasonable and necessary.

There was no evidence presented as to

the number of cars traveling the road during any period of
time, the necessity for cars passing one another, nor any
evidence as to why the road should be more than one lane.
It should be noted that the road in question does not connect to any public road or land and that during any ten year
period before the lawsuit was commenced in 1974 there has not
been a continuous use of the road in question to serve a
subdivision.
Th.e width of the road existing for any period of
~

ten years prior to the commencement of the lawsuit was 5 to
6 feet in 1915 (R. 216, p. 39) to the 12 to 13 feet quoted
above.

In view of the private land surrounding the road and

the minimal use of the road if in fact a public road were
established, there was no support for a road exceeding 12 to
13 feet as existed prior to the development of the subdivisions beyond plaintiffs' land here in question.

Any larger

area dedicated to roadway would constitute a taking of private
property with compensation and would be unconstitutional.
In the event a public road is determined, it should
be no wider than 13 feet, as this is adequate room for a vehicle
to traverse the area.
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
The evidence of use of the portion of Section 35 by
sheepmen, deer hunters and picnickers prior to 1971 under the
facts and circumstances of this case falls far short of meeting the requirements of Section 27-12-89, UCA, 1953, and the
Supreme Court cases that there must be clear and convincing
proof of intent to dedicate or abandon property to the public
and of acceptance by the public.

One undisputed fact which

has great significance is that the road went only to private
grazing land and that there was no public need for access to
the land.

As has been held in· Thompson v. Nelson, supra, the

mere use of a private way does not create a public way.

The

Supreme Court has held in cases cited that use by deer hunters
is not sufficient.

The judgment finding a public way should

be reversed in accordance with Section 27-12-89, UCA, 1953.
Even if a public way were established, it should only
be wide enough as is reasonable and necessary for the uses to
which the road has been put.

During the applicable period the

only uses were. as outlined above with no proof of regularity
of use or need for more than a single lane.

During any ten

year period, the evidence was that the travelled portion did
not exceed 13 feet.

Based upon the evidence of use and the

actual width of the road prior to this lawsuit, 13 feet is a
reasonable width for such a road and the Judgment and Decree
should be modified accordingly.
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Respectfully submitced.
SKEEN AND SKEEN

By:

~$I

R.. SKEEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant was mailed to Defendants-Respondents' attorneys,
postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Richard H. Nebeker
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Stanley S. Adams
Boston Buildl.ng
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
\

on this-

Ii day of July, 1980.
3E-
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